Abstract. Republican candidates often receive between 30% and 40% of the two-way vote share in statewide elections in Massachusetts. For the last three Census cycles, MA has held 9-10 seats in the House of Representatives, which means that a district can be won with as little as 6% of the statewide vote. Putting these two facts together, one may be surprised to learn that a Massachusetts Republican has not won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives since 1994. We argue that the underperformance of Republicans in Massachusetts is not attributable to gerrymandering, nor to the failure of Republicans to field House candidates, but is a structural mathematical feature of the distribution of votes. For several of the elections studied here, there are more ways of building a valid districting plan than there are particles in the galaxy, and every one of them will produce a 9-0 Democratic delegation.
Introduction
Gerrymandering is the practice of using the formation of districts to create a representational advantage for some subsets of the population, or to favor certain kinds of candidates. In recent years, gerrymandering has received increasing levels of attention and public indignation. There are essentially two indicators that are taken by the public and by many commentators as red flags for gerrymandering: bizarre shapes and disproportional outcomes. For instance, the enacted 113th Congressional districting plan in Pennsylvania contained a notorious district nicknamed "Goofy kicking Donald Duck," whose contorted shape was taken by many as prima facie evidence of redistricting abuse. Under this map, Pennsylvania elections exhibited nearly 50-50 splits in party preference, while Republicans held 13 out of 18 seats, or over 72% of the House representation. While there is indeed compelling evidence that Pennsylvania was gerrymandered in a partisan manner [4] , this fact is not established by either shapes or disproportions alone. In this paper, we show that there can also exist benign and structural obstructions to securing representation that have to do with not just the number of votes but how they are distributed around the state. This paper is framed to study a riddle about Republican voting patterns in Massachusetts: why is 1/3 of the vote proving insufficient to secure even 1/9 of the representation? We use a mix of empirical analysis with real voting data and experiments with generated voting data to answer the riddle. We show that uniformity itself can block desired representational outcomes for a group in the numerical minority (like Republicans in Massachusetts), considering both the numbers and the geometry. Though this is mathematically obvious when taken to an extreme, exhibiting actual voting patterns with this level of uniformity is a novel finding.
Massachusetts is one striking case in point, but the broader message is that once the rules have been set, it becomes a scientific question to study the breadth of outcomes left available to the districters. This case describes a surprising limitation on the power to control the representational outcome. In other cases, there will be surprisingly wide latitude, or simply a baseline in a nonintuitive range. We argue that it is only legitimate to compare an observed partisan outcome against the backdrop of actual possibility. Numerical uniformity. We use the phrase "numerical uniformity" to describe a situation in which the vote shares across the building-block units are extremely consistent. In Section 2 we examine the numerical distribution of votes in 13 statewide elections in Massachusetts, showing that for five of them, the numbers alone make it literally impossible to build a R-favoring collection of towns or precincts with enough population to be a Congressional district. Because this type of analysis is run on the numbers only, this result is very strong: no district-sized grouping can be formed, even without requiring contiguity, compactness, or any other spatial constraint on districting. The reason is that elections with in which Republicans are locked out exhibit extremely low variance in the town-and precinct-level voting results. In particular, even in some elections in which a Republican received 30-40% of the overall vote, his vote share (note: they have all been men) rarely exceeded 50% in any precinct, leaving not enough R-favoring precincts to assemble into a grouping of the size of a congressional district.
Geometric uniformity. On the other hand, "geometric uniformity" would describe a situation in which one's partisan preference does not correlate strongly to position within the state, reflected in the absence of partisan enclaves or clusters. In Section 3 we will add a spatial component to our analysis. Even when it is numerically feasible to collect enough precincts to form an R-favoring district, the precincts may not be spatially located in such a way that this can be accomplished in a connected (i.e., contiguous) fashion. We first show visualizations that illustrate the lack of a Republican enclave in the low-variance elections. These graphics suggest that there is low correlation between location and partisanship in these Massachusetts elections. To corroborate this, we compute clustering scores (which measure segregation of Republican votes from Democratic votes). We find that the actual vote distributions have clustering levels that are similar to those that would be observed if sprinkling the Republican votes by drawing randomly from a uniform distribution around the state. This supports the conclusion that geometric uniformity is making a secondary contribution to the partisan underperformance.
In short, the conclusion is that extreme representational outcomes are not always attributable to gerrymandering, nor to overly clustered arrangements of voters from either party, which have sometimes been claimed to force a heavily clustered party to win districts with wastefully high majorities (via "packing"). On the contrary, in this case Republicans are locked out of representation because they are insufficiently clustered: here, the main factor responsible for the lockout of Republicans is actually that the minority party is distributed too uniformly around the state, both numerically and geometrically. Generally, counterintuitive limitations on representation can emerge from a complicated interplay of the numerical and spatial distribution of voter preferences. The effects on representation of the distribution (and not just the share) of votes is a difficult mathematical question and is richly worthy of further study.
While public observers may expect proportional representation as a matter of fairness, even seasoned political scientists often measure fairness in terms of other representational indices. For instance, the efficiency gap, or EG, is sometimes described as measuring parity of wasted votes, but is fundamentally measuring whether the seat share S is close to 2V − 1/2, where V is the vote share. The efficiency gap, EG = 2V −S −1/2, is thought to signify a possible gerrymander when its magnitude is more than 8%. But the Massachusetts data contain five actual vote distributions (Pres 00, Pres 04, Sen 06, Pres 08, Sen 08) for which even an omniscient redistricter with the honorable goal of EG = 0 could not succeed: not a single one of the quintillions of possible 9-district plans has an efficiency gap below 11% in any of those five races. This shows that finding a reasonable baseline to decide when gerrymandering has occurred is a subtler problem than has so far been appreciated in the public discourse or the political science literature.
1.1. Data. Massachusetts is made up of 351 jurisdictions known as towns (also written in some places as townships or municipalities), which has not changed over the timespan covered here. In this language, cities are a subset of towns. Towns do not overlap, and they completely cover the state. Each town is subdivided into some number of precincts, ranging in number from 2166 in 2002 to 2174 in 2016 according to the Secretary of State database [7] . Small changes to precincts are common between elections. In 2016, 125 towns were not subdivided (the town equals 1 precinct), and at the other extreme, Boston was made up of 255 precincts, followed by Springfield with 64. Note that precincts are similar but not identical to Voting Tabulation Districts or VTDs, which are proposed by the Census Bureau every ten years as recommended precincts [8] and are adopted in a slightly modified form in Massachusetts. The Secretary of State's office provided us with a VTD shapefile that reflects the state's intended precincts in 2010. The Census provides a town shapefile.
After the 2010 Census, the number of Congressional delegates apportioned to MA dropped from 10 to 9 because the state's population growth did not keep pace with the country's.
In the tables below, the cast vote data comes from the Secretary of State's website [7] . They offer town-level election results back to the year 2000 and earlier, but precinct-level results only back to 2002. For population numbers, town-level population was retrieved from the Census API directly. Census 2000 population figures were used for elections taking place 2000-2010, and Census 2010 for 2010-2016. The Secretary of State's shapefile included VTD population numbers, but because it did not perfectly match with the precincts in the voting tabular data, population was aggregated up from census blocks to VTDs, and these populations were verified using NHGIS data. We then prorated election data from towns for each election into these VTDs by assigning each VTD the proportion of each candidate's town-wide vote that corresponds to that unit's proportion of the town's area. We note that there is no name-matching used in this process. To assign VTDs to districts in the currently enacted plan, we used the TIGER/Line shapefiles from the 113th Congress, rounded onto towns and precincts by areal allocation.
All of our data, together with scripts needed to run the various algorithms described here, can be found in the public github repositories of the Voting Rights Data Institute [1, 2].
Setup choices:
Election data, number of districts, smallest units, constraints. In order to illustrate this effects of uniformity observed in real voting data, we run this feasibility analysis on election results from 13 Presidential and U.S. Senate elections in Massachusetts. We note that Congressional election results are not considered here because many of the recent races are uncontested. For example, in the 2016 U.S. House election, 5 out of 9 districts had no Republican who filed to run [6] . Therefore, two-way vote share analysis would not be meaningful for these races. 1 We will also choose to analyze the seat share possible out of nine Congressional districts for the sake of consistency, even though our timespan of electoral data includes a period over which the apportionment varied between 9 and 10. Neither decision blunts the impact of the findings, which study the extent to which patterns in real voting data can restrict the range of representation that is possible for a group in the numerical minority.
In the numerical feasibility section we will only require that districts hew close to the standard of equal population and that they are made of whole units, sometimes towns and sometimes precincts. Contiguity of districts and other shape constraints will only be discussed in the geometric section of the paper. Because of the importance of real voting data for this analysis, we must use precincts as the smallest building blocks, since that is the smallest level at which vote returns are available. In practice, the 2011 Congressional plan held 2119 precincts intact while splitting 32, which means that fewer than 1.5% were split.
Using towns or precincts as unsplittable building blocks does have some precedent in law and practice. As a historical matter, the state Constitution of Massachusetts did require in Article XVI that state councillors be elected from contiguous districts that keep intact towns and city wards [5] , but this system of councillors is now obsolete. There is a still-active contiguity requirement for state legislative districts, and a rule to preserve towns as much as is "reasonable," but no formal contiguity or unit-preservation requirement for congressional districts. In fact, only 23 states have a contiguity requirement for congressional districts, while 49 require contiguity for legislative districts. Nonetheless congressional district contiguity is essentially universal in practice. 2 
Arithmetic of Republican underperformance
In this section, we describe a method to determine theoretical bounds on the number of districts with a Republican majority, given only the geographical units, their population, and their vote totals for D and R candidates in a particular election. For this part of the analysis we impose no spatial constraints at all; we do not even require contiguity, but would allow a district constructed out of an arbitrary collection of towns or precincts from around the state. We show, for example, that even though George W. Bush received over 35% of the two-way vote share against Al Gore, it is mathematically impossible to construct a collection of towns, however scattered, with at least 10% of the population and where Bush received more collective votes than Gore. (See Figure 4. The town-level averaging underweights Boston because it is weighted equally to tiny towns like Gosnold (population 75). The precinct-level results overweight Boston because its average precinct population is under 2500, lower than the statewide average of over 3000. (Exact figures vary year to year.) This accounts for the direction of error in the mean of each statistic relative to the statewide (naturally population-weighted) share.
As the table illustrates, the elections from 2000 to 2008 had consistently lower variance in their town-and precinct-level vote shares than can be observed since 2010. Below, we will connect that to the representability of Republicans across these elections.
2.1. Numerical feasibility of R districts. Let's first review the limitations on the power of gerrymanderers that are produced by the numbers alone. We begin with very simplified algebraic bounds. In an abstract districting system with equal vote turnout in its districts, if Party X receives share 0 ≤ V ≤ 1 of the vote, its possible seat shares are constrained to a range, with the actual outcome depending on how the votes are distributed across the districts. At its most ruthlessly efficient, Party X could in principle have barely more than half of the vote in certain districts and no vote in the others, thus earning seat share up to 2V , or twice its vote share. At minimum, a party with less than half of the vote can be shut out entirely by having less than half of each district; if Party X has more than half of the vote, then its opponent has a vote share of 1 − V and a maximum seat share of 2(1 − V ) = 2 − 2V , so the minimum seat share for Party X is 1 − (2 − 2V ) = 2V − 1. For example, a party with 40% of the vote can get anywhere from 0 − 80% of the seats, while a party with 55% of the vote can get anywhere from 10 − 100% of the seats. This naive analysis would project that districters could in principle arrange for Beatty voters in the 2008 Senate race to convert their 32% of the votes to 0 − 64% of the seats.
But the naive analysis does not take into account constraints introduced by the fixed number of districts, by the variation in turnout, or by the discreteness of the building blocks. The feasibility analysis in this section does account for all of those factors. Table 2 shows that in Ed Markey's 2013 special election to the Senate, his opponent's pattern in obtaining 38% of the vote could not have earned him any more than three district wins out of nine, no matter how the districts were drawn, despite the naive bounds that suggest up to six district wins could have been possible. And even more strikingly, though Jeff Beatty earned nearly a third of the vote against Kerry in the Senate race of 2008, Beatty voters in that distribution are actually locked out of representability entirely. The actual observed turnout patterns, and the effect of the mandate to build districts out of intact precincts, have lowered Beatty's ceiling from 5 districts out of 9 all the way to zero. Smaller building blocks should mean more flexibility, but shrinking the building blocks from towns to precincts didn't in this case help Beatty at all.
Here is our method for measuring feasibility in our setup. Suppose that the ideal district size (state population divided by number of districts) is denoted by I. Then we will declare that it is numerically feasible for a party to get n seats in a certain election if there exists a collection of units (towns or precincts) with population at least nI and in which that party has a majority of the two-way vote share. A feasibility bound for the party is the largest such n that has been demonstrated. By contrast, we will say that it is numerically infeasible for a party to get m seats in a given election if there is proven to be no collection with population at least mI and a majority for the party. An infeasibility bound is the smallest such m that has been demonstrated.
We use a simple sorting algorithm to get feasibility and infeasibility bounds for the elections considered here, presenting the results in Table 2 . Often, but not always, the algorithm will produce tight bounds, in the sense that the infeasibility bound is one more than the feasibility bound.
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Our procedure is simply to greedily create the largest R-majority collection possible from the chosen geographic units (in our case, towns or precincts) by including them in order of Republican margin per capita: δ/p = (#R votes − #D votes)/(census population of unit).
The proof supporting this test of feasibility is shown in the appendix, §4. We will carry out the analysis below fixing the number of districts at 9 throughout, which is the Congressional apportionment at the current time. This means that ideal district size is I = 705, 455 for races before 2010 and I = 727, 514 for races after 2010. We can make several observations from the table. Moving to finer granularity of building blocks did not have any impact on the feasibility bounds for most elections. In two cases (Sen 2012 and Sen 2013), the precinct level bounds are sharper. In both cases, a Republican-performing grouping of towns can be made with size 7I but our method produces an inconclusive result about a grouping of size 8I. With precincts, we find that the uncertainty is eliminated and a grouping of size 8I is impossible. The 2016 Presidential election is the only one for which the finer granularity has shifted the feasibility bounds. It is not possible to find scattered towns totaling three districts' worth of population which collectively favor Trump over Clinton, but it becomes possible if precincts are the building blocks. So in that case, it becomes narrowly possible to achieve proportional representation for Trump voters; note, however, that this still falls far short of the seven Trump districts that the simple analysis would have predicted to be accessible by extreme gerrymandering.
Numerical uniformity:
The role of variance. In statistics, the mean of a set of numerical data records its average value, and the variance (or second central moment) tells you how spread out the values are around this mean. We claim that variance in the vote share of a minority group (here, Republicans) can be a primary explanatory factor for poor representational outcomes in districting. At one extreme, this is obvious: if the variance is zero, then the preferences in the state are completely uniform, and every single unit has the same 35% (say) of Republican votes. In this case, we can easily see that districting has no impact at all: every possible district will also have 35% R, and so will be won by Democrats.
Notably, the Gore/Bush election in 2000 had a two-way R vote share of 35.2% and results in zero possible R-majority districts. Meanwhile the Clinton/Trump election had a nearly identical 35.3% R vote share but produces the possibility for as many as two districts with a Trump majority. The fundamental impact of variance should be clear from the figures. A low-variance election with a minority of R votes may have very few units with R share over .5, which are precisely the building blocks needed to form an R-majority district.
Looking back to Table 2 corroborates this finding: 7 out of 13 elections exhibit a mathematical impossibility of representation or fall at least two seats short of proportionality-completely independent of the choices made by districters. These are precisely the seven elections in which the vote totals show lower variance, both at the town level and the precinct level. In five of the elections, this effect is so pronounced that the minority party is completely locked out of any possibility of representation.
Varying variance.
To account for these outcomes, we generated datasets with similar mean vote share to the 2000 and 2016 Presidential elections, adjusting the variance of R-share per unit while maintaining voter turnout and population at actual levels. We assigned R two-way vote shares chosen from a truncated skewed normal distribution with a set mean of 35.25% (the average of the Gore/Bush and Clinton/Trump R vote share) and variances ranging from 0.0020 to 0.0320, covering the range actually observed in Table 1. 4 From those datasets, we reran our procedure to produce bounds on the number of possible R seats. Figure 2 . Skewed truncated normal distributions are shown here with the same mean and different variance as the observed results. These were used to generate election data to test the hypothesis that vote datasets with higher variance would achieve higher levels of numerically feasible representation.
The results, plotted in Figure 3 , strongly corroborate the hypothesis that feasible representation is directly controlled by variance in vote share. In fact, a high enough variance can be seen to make it numerically feasible to overperform proportionality. 
Geometry of Republican underperformance
We now consider the spatial aspects of the vote distribution with respect to the possibilities for district formation.
3.1. Lack of Republican enclaves. Compounding the numerical effects described above is the spatial scatter of the areas preferring Republicans in Massachusetts. To illustrate this, consider forming a grouping of towns by collecting them in order of their R margin per capita δ/p, as above, until the collection is large enough to be a valid district. The result is a dramatically discontiguous assemblage spanning nearly the full state. A similar pattern can be observed in 2006 Senate returns.
range was replaced by another value drawn from the same distribution. This truncation process changes the mean and variance of the distribution being produced, so we ran it iteratively, adjusting the mean and variance until the desired parameters were produced. Throughout, a shape variable of −8 was selected to best capture the observed distributions in historical elections. The resulting distributions can be seen in Figure 2 . 
3.2.
Clustering. The voting data used here makes it possible to test whether, in addition to increased variance, the election results after 2010 exhibit more spatial clustering than before. To assess this we use an index called a capy (or clustering propensity) score, which resembles assortativity scores in network science. (See [3] for a comparative survey of scores of clustering and segregation.)
The geographical units that make up a jurisdiction have populations of different sizes and compositions. In geographical unit v i , we use x i and y i to denote the populations from group X and group Y in that unit. We record the X population data as an integer-valued vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) recording each unit's population, and likewise write y for the Y population figures. If unit v i has a shared boundary of positive length with unit v j , we write i ∼ j. Then let x, y :=
The idea is that x, y is a close approximation to the number of individuals of X type living next to an individual of Y type, either in the same geographical unit or in neighboring units.
5 With this, we define
x, x x, x + x, y + y, y y, y + x, y .
By construction, this score varies from 0 to 1 and measures the tendency of each of the two kinds of population to live next to another member of their own group, rather than the other. In a sufficiently large network, a perfectly uniform distribution where the x i and the y i were constant would earn a score approaching H = 1/2, and a perfectly clustered distribution where the x i = 0 in one region and the y i = 0 in the complementary region would tend towards H = 1. Table 3 shows the observed H(R, D) clustering results for Republican compared to Democratic voters. For each election, we create two comparison points by experiment: the uniform H score is the highest score recorded in 30 trials in which Republican voters were scattered randomly under a uniform distribution until reaching the statewide R share observed in that election. The clustered H score is produced by applying a dynamical step that moves votes into a configuration with higher Table 3 . Clustering scores for Republican versus Democratic voters at the town level in each of the elections discussed in this paper. We show the score H = H(R, D) for a uniform trial, the observed votes, and a highly clustered distribution of voters, each with the statewide share that corresponds accurately to the given election. The numbers are truncated (not rounded) after four decimal places.
tendency for neighbors to have the same vote. 6 As a general matter, we see that the H scores closely resemble the uniform trials, and that there is no significant trend in the H scores over time. In some cases, there are interesting comparisons, such as in comparing the Presidential outcomes in 2000 and 2016-there, we can see that Trump voters are appreciably more clustered than Bush voters were. We conclude that clustering may have a secondary effect on representability, but in a direction that runs counter to the conventional wisdom: the prospects of the minority party for representation get better, not worse, when the voters are more tightly spatially clustered.
We note also that there is a one-way relationship between numerical and geometric uniformity: if there is low variance in observed partisan shares by unit, then all units tend to have the same shares, so there is necessarily no spatial pattern to partisan preference. However, high variance in partisan share can occur in a way that is strongly spatially patterned (such as if there are pronounced enclaves) or in a way that is not (such as if there is a checkerboard pattern of strong support for each party). The findings here strongly support a conclusion that numerically uniform vote patterns create obstructions to representation for a group in the numerical minority. Further work is needed to study the spatial determinants of representability in the high-variance case.
In closing, we reiterate the main lesson of this simple study: the range of possible representational outcomes under valid redistricting is controlled by the numerical and geometric/spatial distribution of voter preferences, and by the local rules of redistricting, in an extremely complex way that one-size-fits-all normative ideals fail to capture. The mathematical challenges of identifying the representational baseline are considerable, but there is significant recent progress in that direction. Any meaningful finding of gerrymandering must be demonstrated against the backdrop of valid alternatives-under the constraints of law, physical geography, and political geography that are actually present in that jurisdiction.
Appendix: Rigorous feasibility bounds
Suppose you have a list of units with corresponding populations p i and R margins δ i (number of R votes minus number of D votes). Re-index so that they are ordered from greatest to least by margin per capita: δ 1/p 1 ≥ δ 2/p 2 ≥ · · · ≥ δn /pn. We will call a collection of units S a grouping, and let p(S) and δ(S) be its population and R margin, found by summing the p i and δ i for its units. Let D k be the grouping indexed by {1, . . . , k}. Let K be the smallest integer k for which δ(D k ) ≤ 0. This means that D K−1 has a collective R majority, but if you add the Kth unit you get a grouping D K that fails to have an R majority. Proof. In Case 1, it is clear that a Republican grouping can be created, because D K−1 is a Republican-majority grouping of sufficient size.
We present examples to illustrate that Case 2 is inconclusive. 
